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Search Theory is an analysis of resource allocation in economic environments with trad-
ing frictions. These frictions include the diﬃculty of bringing potential traders together, co-
ordinating agents’ decisions, informing agents of trading opportunities, and keeping records
of agents’ trading histories. In the market, trading frictions appear in various forms of
transactions cost and they generate important regularities in quantities and prices. For
example, there are unemployed workers, under-utilized capital, and unsold goods in inven-
tory, which indicate that markets are unable to exhaust all potentially desirable trades.
Also, the law of one price predicted for a frictionless economy is at odds with the dispersion
of prices often observed for similar goods.
Earlier models of search theory introduced two elements to capture search frictions
(see Diamond, 1987). One element is a matching function, which generates the frequency
of matches between agents. The other element is a mechanism to determine prices in
individual trades. Two types of models incorporated these elements. One is sequential
search models, in which agents on one side of the market post prices. Agents on the other
side receive price quotes at an exogenous rate and decide sequentially whether to accept
the quotes. The other type is random-matching models, in which the matching frequency
is a function of the ratio of the numbers of agents on the two sides of the market. Such
models determine price by Nash bargaining.
We will refer to these models as models of random search or undirected search, because
agents in the models take the matching frequency as given. With undirected search, the
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and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research support.equilibrium is not able to internalize the externalities in the search process, and so the
equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
One recent development in search theory is the exploration of the mechanisms which
can improve eﬃciency. A particular mechanism is directed search, which allows agents
to use prices to directly aﬀect the matching frequency. Directed search can enable the
market to produce the eﬃcient allocation under the constraint of the matching technology.
This exploration has also led to the formulations of search as a strategic game. Another
development uses search to construct a microfoundation for monetary theory.
This entry will focus on directed search. We will start with a random-matching model
and illustrate the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium. Then, we will describe three models of
directed search and related issues. After describing monetary search theory brieﬂy, we will
conclude. To simplify the description, we will treat the market as a labour market and let
the time horizon be one period. The models can be adapted to the goods market and be
extended to inﬁnite horizon.
1. Random-Matching and Ineﬃciency
Consider a labour market with a large number of workers and ﬁrms. The number of
workers searching for jobs is a ﬁxed number u. All workers are the same and they are
risk neutral. When employed, a worker produces goods whose value is y>0. When
unemployed, a worker enjoys leisure, the utility of which is normalized to 0. The number
of vacancies is v, which is determined by competitive entry of ﬁrms. A potential ﬁrm can
incur a cost c to create a vacancy, where 0 <c<y . The technology of production has
constant returns to scale so that a ﬁrm treats each vacancy separately. Normalize the
production cost to 0.
L e tu su s eam a t c h i n gf u n c t i o n ,M(u,v), to describe the total number of matches in the
2period. Let θ = u/v denote the “tightness” of the market. The matching probability for a
worker is p(θ)=M(u,v)/u and the matching probability for a vacancy is q(θ)=M(u,v)/v.
Assume that M is increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable in each argument for all θ such
that p,q ∈ (0,1). Moreover, the function has constant returns to scale. Thus, p(θ)i s
decreasing in θ, q(θ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nθ,a n dq(θ)=θp(θ). Moreover, assume that q(θ)i s







Then, s(θ)=1+θp0(θ)/p. The matching share of ﬁr m si s( 1− s).
Once a worker and a ﬁrm are matched, the two choose the wage for the worker, w.A s -
sume that this is done with Nash bargaining, which maximizes the geometrically weighted
surplus of the two sides of the match: wσ(y −w)1−σ. Here, the worker’s bargaining weight
is σ ∈ [0,1]. The solution for the wage share is w/y = σ.
The value of a vacancy is J = q(θ)(y − w) and the value of a worker’s search is
V = p(θ)w. With competitive entry of ﬁrms, a ﬁrm’s net proﬁt is zero; i.e., J = c.T h i s
equilibrium condition can be rewritten as (1−σ)q(θ)=c/y. A unique solution for θ exists
if 0 <c<(1 − σ)y.
In the equilibrium, some workers are unemployed and some jobs are vacant. However,
the existence of unemployment alone is not a suﬃcient indication of ineﬃciency. With the
matching technology, not all resources can be fully utilized. The appropriate notion of
eﬃciency must respect the constraint of this technology.
Let us measure eﬃciency with a social welfare function. Deﬁne social welfare as the
weighted sum of expected values of agents in the economy, where all agents are given the
same weight. This measure is also equal to the expected utility of an agent who is ignorant
o fw h e t h e rh eo rs h ei saw o r k e ro raﬁrm. Because ﬁrms earn zero net proﬁt, the welfare
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to substitute w, we can express the welfare level as aggregate output minus the vacancy
cost, i.e., u[p(θ)y − c/θ]. Because u is exogenous, the level of θ which maximizes welfare
satisﬁes −θ2p0(θ)=c/y. Comparing this eﬃcient outcome with the equilibrium outcome,
we can see that the equilibrium is eﬃcient if and only if:
σ = s(θ).
This condition is the Hosios condition (see Hosios, 1990). It is required for eﬃciency
for the following reason. The social value created by a marginal ﬁrm is y[∂M(u,v)/∂v]=
y(1 −s)q. In contrast, the ﬁrm’s value in the equilibrium is q(y −w). For the equilibrium
to be eﬃcient, the ﬁrm’s value in the equilibrium must be equal to its social value. This
requirement is met if and only if the wage share is equal to the matching share of workers,
as the Hosios condition requires.
More speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm’s entry into the market creates two externalities. One is positive
— the presence of an additional ﬁrm increases the matching frequency of workers. The
other externality is negative — an additional ﬁrm reduces the matching frequency of other
ﬁrms. The Hosios condition ensures that the two externalities cancel out with each other.
If σ >s (θ), a ﬁrm is under-compensated for its entry cost and the amount of entry is
deﬁcient; if σ <s (θ), a ﬁrm is over-compensated and the amount of entry is excessive.
With random matching, the equilibrium cannot satisfy the Hosios condition generically,
because both sides of the condition involve exogenous elements of the model. In particular,
when the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, the matching share s is a constant which is
unrelated to the workers’ wage share.
The ineﬃciency will remain if a sequential search model is used instead of a random-
matching model. With sequential search, ﬁrms post wages. There can be a non-degenerate
4distribution of wage shares in the equilibrium. However, the matching share will still be
independent of the wage share.
2. Directed Search and Eﬃciency
Directed search links the wage share to the matching share by explicitly modelling an
agent’s tradeoﬀ between the wage and the matching frequency. To capture this tradeoﬀ,
suppose that all agents expect each wage level to be associated with a market tightness
by a function θ(w). Search is “directed” in the sense that, by posting a particular wage, a
ﬁrm expects to change the matching probability by aﬀecting workers’ applications. For a
ﬁrm posting wage w, the matching probability is q(θ(w)); for a worker who applies to wage
w, the matching probability is p(θ(w)). The functions p(θ)a n dq(θ) have the properties
assumed above. Given the tightness function, each ﬁrm chooses a wage to post to maximize
the expected value J = q(θ(w))(y − w), and each worker chooses to apply to a wage that
maximizes the expected value V = p(θ(w))w. The equilibrium tightness must be consistent
with competitive entry and workers’ application decisions.
Without restricting the function θ(.), there can be many equilibria. For example, take
an arbitrary wage w0 ∈ (0,y), and let θ0 satisfy: q(θ0)(y − w0)=c.S u p p o s et h a tw o r k e r s
believe that all ﬁrms will post only wage w0. With this belief, workers will apply only to
wage w0. But if no worker applies to other wages, then all ﬁrms will indeed post only wage
w0.T h a ti s ,t h ep a i r( w0,θ0), together with the particular belief, is an equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, θ(w) is not well-deﬁned for w 6= w0,b e c a u s et h e r ei sn oﬁrm or worker at such
wages.
One way to avoid this problem is to introduce a small measure of non-optimizing ﬁrms
that post every feasible wage and to analyze the limit of the equilibrium when this measure
approaches zero. Another way is to impose restrictions on the beliefs out of the equilibrium,
5as we do here. Let E be the set of equilibrium wages. For w∗ ∈ E, denote the expected
value of applying to w∗ as V ∗ = p(θ(w∗))w∗. We require that, for every w∗ ∈ E,t h e
function θ(.)m u s ts a t i s f yp(θ(w))w = V ∗ for w in a neighbourhood of w∗.T h a ti s ,aﬁrm
believes that workers will apply to a deviating wage to such an extent that they will be
indiﬀerent between the deviating wage and the equilibrium wage.
The restriction implies the following features of the tradeoﬀ between the wage level and
the matching probability. First, because p(θ) is a decreasing function, a worker who applies
to a wage higher than an equilibrium wage expects to face a tighter market and, hence, a
lower matching probability. Similarly, a ﬁrm that posts a wage higher than an equilibrium
wage expects to increase its matching probability. Second, because p(θ)i sd i ﬀerentiable,
the restriction implies that the function θ(.)i sd i ﬀerentiable. Thus, the tradeoﬀ between
the wage level and the matching probability is smooth.
To characterize the equilibrium, suppose w∗ ∈ E,w i t hV ∗ = p(θ(w∗))w∗.E a c h ﬁrm
takes V ∗ as given and chooses w to solve the following problem:
max q(θ(w))(y − w)s . t .p(θ(w))w = V
∗.
Under the earlier assumptions on the function q(θ), the problem above is a concave problem
and the solution is interior for all V ∗ ∈ (0,y). Using the relationship q(θ)=θp(θ), we can
derive the ﬁrst-order condition of the problem as w∗/y = s(θ). The equilibrium satisﬁes
the Hosios condition!
As before, we can determine the tightness in the equilibrium by the entry condition,
J = c. Then, the worker’s indiﬀerence condition recovers V ∗.I t i s e a s y t o s e e t h a t t h e
market tightness is identical to the eﬃcient one. Thus, the equilibrium is eﬃcient.
The reason why the equilibrium is eﬃcient can be related to hedonic pricing. With
directed search, the market functions as if there is a price (in terms of wage) for every level
6of tightness. The inverse of the function θ(.) serves as such a pricing function. Given this
function, each worker chooses to apply to a wage level that maximizes his or her expected
utility and each ﬁrm posts a wage to maximize expected proﬁt. In the equilibrium, the
market prices the tightness eﬃciently. That is, the increase in wage that a ﬁrm is willing to
give for a marginal increase in the tightness is equal to the increase in wage that a worker
asks for to compensate for a tighter market. As a result, the equilibrium internalizes
search externalities. Because of this link to hedonic pricing, directed search is also called
competitive search (see Moen, 1997).
Directed search can also induce the eﬃcient amount of investment. Suppose that each
ﬁrm chooses the level of capital before entering the labour market. Anticipating that the
equilibrium wage will divide the match surplus eﬃciently, ﬁrms will choose the eﬃcient
level of capital.
3. Strategic Formulation of Directed Search
In the above analysis, the matching function is a black box — it is speciﬁed exogenously
as in models of undirected search. Because the matching function is important for the
analysis of eﬃciency, it is important to derive a matching function from agents’ strategic
behaviour. Peters (1991) and Burdett et al. (2001) formulate such a strategic game of
directed search. The formulation also justiﬁes the restriction above on the beliefs out of
equilibrium. Let us describe the game where both u and v are ﬁxed numbers greater than
or equal to two. Competitive entry can be introduced in the same way as above.
The one-period game is as follows. First, all ﬁrms post wages simultaneously. Each
worker observes all ﬁrms’ posted wages. (The essence of the model is the same if each
worker can observe only two wages that are randomly drawn from posted wages.) Then,
all workers choose the ﬁrms to which they apply. Assume that a worker can apply to only
7one job in the period, but the worker can use mixed strategy in the application. After
receiving applicants, a ﬁrm randomly chooses one to be employed. Production takes place
immediately and an employed worker is paid the posted wage. Then, the game ends.
There are many equilibria of this game that are asymmetric in the sense that identical
agents do not use the same strategy. When u = v = 2, for example, one asymmetric
equilibrium is that one worker applies only to one ﬁrm and the other worker applies only
to the other ﬁrm, while the two ﬁrms post zero wage. In this equilibrium, there is no
unemployment — unemployment is eliminated by implicit coordination between the two
workers. That is, a worker believes that the other worker will not apply to the same job
as he or she does. Other asymmetric equilibria involve trigger strategies that also feature
implicit coordination. Such coordination is unlikely to be attainable when there are many
agents in the market.
To emphasize the lack of coordination, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium, where all
(identical) workers use the same mixed strategy to apply to the jobs. In this equilibrium,
it is probable that two or more workers will apply to the same job, in which case some
workers will be unemployed.
To characterize the equilibrium, consider a particular ﬁrm, called ﬁrm A.S u p p o s e
that other ﬁrms post wage w,b u tﬁrm A posts wage x.I fx is close to w, some workers
will apply to ﬁrm A: if no other worker applied to ﬁrm A, a lone applicant to ﬁrm A
would be employed with certainty, which would generate higher expected utility than
applying to w. In fact, workers will increase the probability of applying to ﬁrm A until
the expected utility from this application is the same as that from applying to other
ﬁrms. Let a be the probability with which a worker applies to ﬁrm A. Then, ﬁrm A will
receive one or more workers with probability [1 − (1 − a)u], and the expected number of
applicants received by the ﬁrm will be ua. A worker who applies to ﬁrm A will be employed
8with probability [1 − (1 − a)u]/(ua). Because a worker’s application probabilities across
the ﬁrms must add up to one, a worker applies to each ﬁrm other than ﬁrm A with
probability π(a)=( 1− a)/(v − 1). The probability of employment in such a ﬁrm is
[1 − (1 − π(a))u]/(uπ(a)). For a worker to be indiﬀerent between ﬁrm A and other ﬁrms,
the expected payoﬀ must be the same from these ﬁrms. That is,
1 − (1 − a)u
ua
x =
1 − [1 − π(a)]u
uπ(a)
w.
This equation deﬁnes a smooth function a = f(x,w). This function serves the same role
as the tightness function did in the above formulation of directed search — it describes how
a ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer will aﬀect workers’ application, given other ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers. Note that
f is an increasing function of x.T a k i n go t h e rﬁrms’ wage oﬀe r sa sg i v e n ,ﬁrm A chooses
x to solve:
max (y − x)[1− (1 − a)
u]s . t . a = f(x,w).
Denote the solution to this problem as x = g(w).
A symmetric equilibrium is a wage level w such that w = g(w). In this equilibrium,
a = π(a)=1 /v.T h eﬁrst-order condition of the above maximization problem, evaluated
in the equilibrium, yields:
w = y
"







The formulation above reveals two features of a market with a ﬁnite number of agents.
First, the number of matches generated in the equilibrium is v[1 − (1 − 1/v)u]. This
matching technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. The reason is that when the
number of agents increases, the coordination failure becomes more severe, and so the
number of matches per agent falls. Second, when a ﬁrm chooses its wage oﬀer, it cannot
take as given the payoﬀ which a potential applicant can get by applying elsewhere. We
9have made this interdependence explicit with the notation π(a). That is, when ﬁrm A
raises the oﬀer, it will attract all workers to apply to it with a higher probability, which
will increase the probability of employment at other ﬁrms. For any given oﬀer by other
ﬁrms, a worker’s payoﬀ of applying to those ﬁrms will increase as a result of the wage
increase by ﬁrm A. These two features complicate the analysis.
Fortunately, the complexity disappears in the limit when the market becomes inﬁnitely
large. Suppose that u and v approach inﬁnite, with a ﬁxed ratio θ = u/v. Then, the
matching probability is (1 −e−θ)f o raﬁrm and (1− e−θ)/θ for a worker. These matching
probabilities have all the properties assumed above and, in particular, they are independent
of the scale. Moreover, uπ(a) → θ, which is independent of an individual ﬁrm’s oﬀer, x.
The payoﬀ t oaw o r k e rw h oa p p l i e st oaﬁrm other than ﬁrm A is w(1 − e−θ)/θ,w h i c hi s
also independent of x. In the limit economy, the equilibrium satisﬁes the Hosios condition
and it is eﬃcient.
4. Other Pricing Mechanisms and Price Dispersion
Price-posting is not the only mechanism to direct search. There are other mechanisms
of directed search which can generate eﬃciency as well. Auction is an example (e.g., Julien
et al., 2000). In contrast to price-posting, auction induces price dispersion. Thus, eﬃciency
is not necessarily linked to a uniform price in an economy with risk-neutral agents.
Consider the following game with ﬁrst-price auctions. Each ﬁrm announces a reserve
wage and the following scheme. If two or more workers participate in the ﬁrm’s auction,
the participants bid on the wage and the lowest bidder is employed at the bid wage; if two
or more workers have the lowest bid, one of them is chosen randomly by the ﬁrm; if only
one worker participates, the worker is paid the reserve wage. After observing all ﬁrms’
announcements, workers choose the auction in which they will participate. A worker can
10participate in only one ﬁrm’s auction, although the choice can be a mixed strategy.
Choose an arbitrary ﬁrm and call it ﬁrm A.L e tx be the reserve wage announced by
ﬁrm A and a the probability with which a worker participates in this ﬁrm’s auction. For a
worker who participates in ﬁrm A’s auction, there are two possible outcomes. The ﬁrst is
that the worker is the only participating worker, in which case the worker gets wage x.T h i s
outcome occurs with probability (1 −a)u−1. The other possibility is that the ﬁrm receives
one or more other participants. In this case, the participants bid the wage down to 0.
Thus, by participating in ﬁrm A’s auction, a worker expects to obtain a value (1−a)u−1x.
For ﬁrm A, there are also two cases. If only one worker participates in the ﬁrm’s auction,
proﬁti s( y − x). This case occurs with probability ua(1 − a)u−1.I ft w oo rm o r ew o r k e r s
participate, proﬁti sy. The probability for this case is [1−(1−a)u −ua(1−a)u−1]. Thus,




1 − (1 − a)




For a ﬁrm other than ﬁrm A,l e tr be the reserve wage announced by the ﬁrm, π(a)
the probability of a worker’s participation in the ﬁrm’s auction, and V (r,a) the expected
value for a worker from such participation.
In order for a worker to be indiﬀerent between ﬁrm A’s auction and other ﬁrms’ auctions,
t h ee x p e c t e dv a l u em u s tb et h es a m e ;i . e . ,( 1− a)u−1x = V (r,a). Taking this condition
as a constraint and taking other ﬁrms’ auctions as give, ﬁrm A chooses x to maximize the
expected proﬁta b o v e .L e tx = g(r) be the optimal choice. Then, a symmetric equilibrium
is a reserve wage r such that r = g(r).
As in the case of wage-posting, the characterization of the equilibrium is simpliﬁed
in the limit economy where u →∞and θ = u/v ∈ (0,∞). In such a limit, we have
π(a)v → 1. Hence, π(a)a n dV (r,a)a r ei n d e p e n d e n to fa. Solving the above maximization
11yields r = y. Thus, in contrast to directed search with wage posting, auction generates a
wage diﬀerential. Some employed workers are paid their productivity but others are paid
their reservation wage, 0.
Despite the dispersion of wages, the equilibrium is eﬃcient. With risk-neutral agents,
it is expected wage, rather than the actual wage, that is important for eﬃciency. With
auction, the expected payoﬀ is ye−θ to a worker and y
h
1 − (1 + θ)e−θ
i
to a ﬁrm. These
expected payoﬀs are the same as those in directed search with wage posting.
5. Related Issues
(1) Risk aversion and asymmetric information. When workers are risk averse, diﬀerent
mechanisms of directed search can diﬀer in eﬃciency. For example, price-posting generates
lower risks in workers’ income than auction. If the insurance market is imperfect, then
wage-posting may give higher expected utility to workers than auction. Moreover, unem-
ployment insurance, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes, can improve welfare in this case (see
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). On the other hand, price-posting is unlikely to be eﬃcient
when there is asymmetric information about the quality of goods in sale or workers’ pro-
ductivity. Auction is a better mechanism to allocate resources in the presence of private
information.
(2) Heterogeneity and assortative matching. Directed search models can be extended to
allow workers to be heterogeneous. To achieve eﬃciency in such an extension, ﬁrms must
rank diﬀerent types of workers in addition to announcing wages. Heterogeneity can also
appear on both sides of the market. In this case, an interesting question is whether the
matching pattern is assortative, that is, whether similar attributes are matched with each
other. In a frictionless economy, the eﬃcient matching pattern is positively assortative,
provided that the attributes on the two sides of the market are complementary. Moreover,
12the competitive equilibrium can implement the eﬃcient matching outcome. When search
frictions are introduced through undirected search, neither is the equilibrium pattern of
matches assortative nor is it eﬃcient (e.g., Sattinger, 1995, and Shimer and Smith, 2000).
Introducing directed search can restore eﬃciency. However, the eﬃcient matching pattern
may be non-assortative when utility is transferable (e.g., Shi, 2001). There is a tradeoﬀ
between the matching quality and the matching rate.
(3) Multiple applications. Most search models assume that an agent on one side of the
market can visit only one agent on the other side of the market in a period; for example, a
worker can apply only to one job at a time. This assumption may not be realistic. When
workers can apply to multiple jobs simultaneo u s l y ,t h e r ei san e ws o u r c eo ft h ef a i l u r eo f
coordination among ﬁrms: two ﬁrms may select the same worker and one of them will fail
to obtain the worker. If the left-out ﬁrm has no recourse to other applicants it received,
then the equilibrium is ineﬃcient even with directed search. However, there are rules of
selection, such as the one described by Gale and Shapley (1962), that can eliminate this
diﬃculty of coordination and restore eﬃciency.
(4) On-the-job search. Search on the job is rarely examined in directed search models;
sequential (undirected) search models have dominated the analysis on this topic. See
Mortensen, 2003, for the references. These models are constructed typically in continuous
time. They assume that each worker, employed or not, receives a wage oﬀer according to
a Poisson process. While an unemployed worker receives one oﬀer at a time, an employed
worker eﬀectively receives two oﬀers — his current wage and the new oﬀer from another
ﬁrm. In this environment, the equilibrium must have a continuous distribution of wages
with no mass point in the interior of the support; otherwise, a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ function would
be discontinuous on the right side of the mass point. These models yield strong predictions
on the shape of the wage distribution, some of which are counter-factual.
136. Search as a Microfoundation for Monetary Theory
A surprising development of search theory is its use in monetary theory. For monetary
economics, a fundamental question is why intrinsically useless objects, such as ﬁat money,
can have a positive value in the equilibrium. A familiar but informal answer is that such
objects relieve the diﬃculty of exchange by acting as media of exchange. To capture this
role of money, traditional monetary theory has used shortcuts while keeping the assumption
of frictionless (Walrasian) markets. Examples include the requirement that agents must
hold cash in advance of purchases and the assumption that money yields direct utility
which cannot be generated by other assets. These shortcuts seem incompatible with the
Walrasian markets in the model and they are unable to explain why diﬀerent media of
exchange can have diﬀerent values. To formalize the diﬃculty of exchange, Kiyotaki and
Wright (1993) abandoned the shortcuts and replaced the Walrasian exchange with random
bilateral matches. The resulting model is a value theory of money, which gives money
ar o l ei ni m p r o v i n ge ﬃciency of the market. Shi (1995), and Trejos and Wright (1995),
integrated this value theory of money with a theory of price.
Monetary theory has gone one step further to analyze optimal trading mechanisms.
Using the method of mechanism design, the theory characterizes the set of allocations that
are compatible with agents’ incentives in the presence of search frictions. Next, the theory
examines the eﬃcient allocations and asks whether the implementation of these allocations
entails particular types of trade, such as the use of money, banking, or a payments system,
e.g., Green and Zhou (2005). This analysis has clariﬁed the relationship between optimal
trading mechanisms and diﬀerent components of search frictions, such as the diﬃculty for
agents to meet, the diﬃculty for the society to keep record of agents’ transactions, and the
diﬃculty of enforcing trades.
147. Conclusions
Search theory was initially formulated to understand price dispersion and unemploy-
ment. Recent research has shifted the focus to the pricing mechanism and eﬃciency in
frictional economies. Directed search is formulated to allow agents to explicitly make a
tradeoﬀ between prices and matching frequency. The main ﬁnding is that directed search
can restore eﬃciency that failed in earlier search models. However, even the eﬃcient alloca-
tion cannot fully utilize all resources, because of the constraint of the matching technology.
Moreover, the eﬃcient allocation may not have the assortative pattern that emerges in a
frictionless economy. The literature has explored diﬀerent pricing mechanisms of directed
search and used search to develop a microfoundation for monetary theory.
This entry has omitted the empirical work o fu s i n gs e a r c hm o d e l st oe x p l a i nw a g e
distribution and inequality. For this literature, see Mortensen (2003).
By focusing on pricing mechanisms and eﬃciency, the research has brought search
theory close to the task of analyzing the interactions between trades inside economic orga-
nizations and outside in the market. These interactions are important for explaining the
observed forms of contracts and trading institutions. Monetary search theory has already
taken up this task by using the approach of mechanism design. Other ﬁelds can also beneﬁt
from incorporating search frictions. An example is the literature on optimal dynamic con-
tracts. This literature characterizes optimal contracts that a ﬁrm can provide to workers
who repeatedly receive shocks to their tastes and productivity that are unobservable to
the ﬁrm. The typical assumption is either that agents can fully commit to the contracts
o rt h a tt h e yc a n n o tc o m m i ta ta l l .T h i sa s s u m p tion has produced unrealistic predictions
o nt h et i m ep r o ﬁle of agents’ utilities. To improve the predictions, it seems important to
allow agents in a contractual relationship to search for other contracts. This allowance will
endogenize the duration in which an agent will stay in a particular contract. In general,
15the integration of search theory and contract theory awaits future research.
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